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 by Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., FS
 Seymour Deitchman, On Being A Super-
 power And Not Knowing What To Do
 About It, Boulder Colorado, Westview
 Press, 2000, 350 pages, $34.00.
 It book ous is fitting with should his that recognition appear Sy Deitchman' almost by simultane- MORS s new as
 book should appear almost simultane-
 ous with his recognition by MORS as
 winner of Year 2000's Vance Wanner
 Award. The criteria for the Wanner award
 are very broad; On Being A Superpower is
 similarly broad in developing the basis of
 a national strategy. Deitchman is indeed
 an elder statesman of our profession.
 When I was a beginning student at NPS
 he published in the Operations Research
 Journal (Nov-Dec 1962) an early classic,
 "A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla War-
 fare" with his original mixed-law equa-
 tion, and just as important, extensive data
 from unconventional operations.
 Most attempts at developing national
 strategy are committee efforts, with the
 inevitable accommodation of diverse
 points of view. Deitchman, in his long and
 productive career at IDA and on many
 advisory boards such as the National
 Research Council, the National Academy
 of Sciences and the Navy Studies Board,
 knows this full well. The charm of his
 new book is that it is one man's attempt to
 draw on a lifetime of experience to reach a
 unified and self-consistent conclusion
 about the direction we should be taking.
 At the same time Deitchman says in
 the Preface he does not intend to be pre-
 scriptive in the fashion of most govern-
 ment advisory committees. "This book,"
 he writes, "by contrast, is descriptive: It
 concentrates less (but not negligibly) on
 what I think ought to be done and more
 (but not exclusively) on what I think is
 likely to be done by our nation in further-
 ance of its national security. It also
 explains why."
 If this seems a paradox, Deitchman' s
 resolution lies in a determined effort to
 describe what we are today based on how
 we got here over the last 50 years or so,
 followed by his best shot at what is tran-
 spiring now that can form the basis of a
 coherent future national policy and mili-
 tary strategy.
 Chapter One contains three fanciful sce-
 narios, realistic in their intricacy and
 intended to illustrate the cul de sacs the
 world's sole superpower can meander into.
 Deitchman' s purpose is to contrast the
 messiness of real world problems with "the
 standard conflict scenarios used to plan
 military strategy and to set requirements
 for the armed forces [which] don't deal
 with the unexpected." He champions the
 need for a national policy that is more
 robust in anticipating and heading off strat-
 egy traps and an armed force somewhat
 larger and quite a bit more adaptable.
 Chapter Two entitled "The Evaporation
 of the U. S. A." describes a new North
 American continent in the year 2100 and
 how we got there. Deitchman has some fun
 and so will you as he shows "how the
 geopolitical map of North American can
 change in a century or less. Improbable
 you say? [And you will.] Well, look at how
 much it changed between 1750 and
 1850..."
 Chapter Three, "Where Does the World
 Seem to be Going?" warrants close reading
 because it will be a basis of later conclu-
 sions. Since it is a sweeping economic,
 political and sociological tour de monde ,
 every reader will take exception in places,
 though the places will all be different. For
 my taste, Deitchman is too silent on ideo-
 logical influences. The many threatening
 faces of Islam are a serious oversight, and
 if he thinks communism is dying in China
 and Cuba and dead in Latin America he
 ought to say so. But this is a strong chapter
 in which he shows that during the Cold
War the US spread its influence by eco-
 nomic means. The American economic
 mpire and Pax Americana was probably
 as powerful and profitable in the latter 20th
 Century as was ever the British political
 empire and Pax Britannica in the latter
 19th Century.
 In Chapters Four and Five, Deitchman
 gives us his assessment of where the US
 itself seems to be going and some resulting
 dilemmas. I think these are his least suc-
 cessful chapters. By assiduously trying to
 be "descriptive" and balanced, what he
 covers is pretty bland and what goes
 unmentioned is sure to be noticed by some
 readers. His is a largely secular and
 humanist appraisal in which religion's
 influence is muted. Nowhere evident is the
 striking phenomenon pointed out by
 Robert Fogel in his The Fourth Great
 Awakening and the Future of Egalitańan-
 ism , which is that discord, while just as
 prevalent in the US today, has shifted from
 material aspects of life to immaterial ones.
 The footholds gained by communism and
 populism in the great depression have been
 reduced to toeholds. The passionate dis-
 cord today is now over human values.
 "The Rich" by and large work the longest
 hours now and earn their success. Leisure-
 ly Newport summers of the 1890s for the
wealthy compare with intense Newport
 Beach weekends in the 1990s, accompa-
 nied by cell phones and laptops. Neverthe-
 less, to be more than casually alert for such
 omissions would not only be churlish but
 would miss the point of Deitchman' s solo
 effort, which is to tell us where he's com-
 ing from as the foundation for where he's
 going.
 And where he's going is increasingly
 solid and succinct in the final three chap-
 ters.
 In Chapter 6, Deitchman covers the
 armed forces, their evolution in the 20th
 century, and what will or ought to be hap-
 pening in the 21st century. Here his experi-
 ence is deepest. His appraisals are strong
 and on the whole trustworthy. For instance,
 he astutely notes the often-overlooked seri-
 ousness of combat fratricide. He says it has
 grown, which is wrong because on the
 ground it has been constant since World
 War II, but he also says if we do not try
 harder then fratricide will grow, which is
 very likely true. Regarding intelligence he
 makes the salient point that ISR systems do
 not scale down in proportion to a reduction
 in fighting elements such as tanks, planes
 and ships. Though linked to the weapons,
 information gathering must be governed by
its own calculus. He says the present bud-
 get cannot sustain the American armed
 forces. This is no surprise to a MORS read-
 er, but here is the place to observe that
 Deitchman has a larger audience in mind,
 evidently policy makers and their advisers
 in think tanks and on the staffs of the leg-
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 islative and executive branches. The
 MORS reader will, however, be interested
 in his quantitative appraisal of how much
 more investment he supports and for what.
 In Chapter 7, Deitchman expounds the
 national strategy he sees emerging. He
 does not claim it as his own but observes it
 as a happening and would hasten recogni-
 tion of its reasonableness.
 Thus, the 'big idea' emerging after the
 Cold War is that we will preserve
 America's security by crafting, then
 nurturing and, in effect, leading the
 development of the world free-market
 economy on the assumption that
 democracy and peace will follow free
 development of that economy. . . This
 is not a strategy that has been articulat-
 ed this way in any of our public forums,
 and indeed many would object to the
 crass commercialism that it seems to
 convey. But it describes a strategic
 direction in which the nation seems to
 be moving without much planning
 [and] its scope is broad enough to
 accommodate any of the moral and
 humanitarian responsibilities we
 believe we must accept as the world's
 most powerful democracy.
 Deitchman cites evidence that it was eco-
 nomic strength that won the Cold War (I
 wish he had seen the contribution of Presi-
 dent Eisenhower to that end more clearly).
 One may conclude, he believes, that such a
 national policy is not only emerging but
 crying for recognition.
 One must not hastily conclude that
 Deitchman is belaboring the obvious. The
 Greens and others who decry happiness
 through economic growth and prosperity
 must reject the strategy. Beyond that, US
 economic advantage is waning and will not
 last forever: the rise of mainland China, the
 potential of the European Union and
 Deitchman' s own imaginative Chapter 2
 (which I leave for you to read and ponder)
 all suggest that his deduced but embraced
 national strategy will run out of steam
 someday.
 I myself am contrarian enough to
 believe that without some provisos such as
 the Weinberger Doctrine to constrain ram-
 pant intervention, then the "Deitchman
 strategy" untempered is a license to
 indulge in attempts to solve too many
 problems around the world. One could, in
 fact, argue for a more modest American
 strategy of maintaining freedom of the seas
 for free trade by all (which is very popular
 among the world's nations), while exercis-
 ing great caution (à la President Eisenhow-
 er) toward active military intervention
 overseas. Deitchman could well argue that
 this milder policy is an included case. Per-
 haps he takes us as far as he wishes and
 would have us embrace the notion of eco-
 nomic leadership and intervention as our
 core strategy before adding refinements
 and constraints.
 The strongest section in the book -
 certainly my favorite and by itself worth
 the price of it - is the section entitled
 " Crafting Armed Forces To Match " a
 strategy of economic superiority. Deitch-
 man would make some adjustment of Ser-
 vice roles and missions (without changing
 Title X). There is something in his propos-
 als to offend every Service, barring per-
 haps the Navy, but it is obvious that these
 are realignments he has thought about for a
 long time and which are very coherent.
 The closing chapter, 'The Real World,"
 is a reprise: "[Oļur national security strate-
 gy, slowly emerging from revealed behav-
 ior rather than from any logically articulat-
 ed long-range rationale and plan, is
 appearing as a fundamentally economic
 one." Where the world and the nation seem
 to be going, the subjects of Chapters 3 and
 4, will complicate the implementation. The
 real world is perverse and keeps "present-
 ing us with problems for which there are
 no easy solutions, such as smuggling of
 drugs, money, people and arms to terror-
 ists, and threats to create and use nuclear,
 chemical and biological weapons" and
 other genocidal actions that will demand
 our moral involvement but incur the
 human and economic costs of intervention.
 With Sun-Tzu it is better to overcome
 one's opposition without fighting battles,
 writes Deitchman:
 It can be argued that the strategy of
 economic dominance that we appear
 to be developing is the appropriate
 one to achieve that. However, for it
 to work we would have to display a
 high degree of national unity about
 that strategy - or any other. . . We
 would also have to accept, as a
 nation, the necessity - which will
 accompany any strategy - to build
 effective military force and to use it,
 for friendly pursuits mainly [for
 example with a Navy sufficient to
 protect the world's sea lanes and
 trade] but in anger on occasion.
 Since the end of the Gulf War, nei-
 ther the necessary degree of national
 unity nor the essential attention and
 resources allocated to the armed
 forces have been easily detectable.
 On Being A Superpower and Not
 Knowing What To Do About It is a fine
 book, achieving a unity of purpose that no
 advisory panel could produce. Deitchman
 reaches far beyond the bounds of military
 operations research, but we may all be
 proud to claim him as our own and as a
 worthy winner of the Vance Wanner trib-
 ute. O
 Announcing the 15th Military
 Medicine Conference, June 4-7, 2001
 The 15th Military Medicine Confer-
 ence will be held at the Jay P Sanford
 Auditorium of the Uniform Services
 University, Bethesda, Maryland, 4-7
 June 2001. The theme of this forum
 will be A Challenge to Readiness -
 Maintaining Currency in Military Med-
 ical Education. The conference will
 consist of a plenary session with lectures
 provided by subject matter experts in the
 fields of medicine, nursing, and futur-
 ism, followed by breakout sessions cov-
 ering program topics that include:
 Emerging Weapons Threats, Changes in
 Doctrine, New Missions, Changes in
 Combat Stress and New Military Tech-
 nologies, among others. If you are inter-
 ested in participating, contact COL Clif-
 ford C. Cloonan, MD, Vice Chair of
 the Department of Military & Emer-
 gency Medicine, Uniform Services Uni-
 versity School of Medicine. He may be
 reached by telephone at 301-295-0223
 or e-mail at ccloonan@usuhs.mil.
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